Smt. Manda Savarna - Petitioner 
Vs.
Branch Manager, L I C of India & Another - Respondents

Before: Hon'ble Mr.Justice Suhas C.Sen, President, Dr.(Mrs.) R.Thamarajakshi, Member, Mr. S.P.Bagla, Member, Hon'ble Mr.Justice C.L.Chaudhry, Member, Hon'ble Mr.Justice J.K.Mehra, Member.

PER SUHAS C.SEN J.

The Petitioner is a widow. Her husband, M.Ganga Reddy, had taken two life insurance policies, one for a sum of Rs. 1,15,000/- (Policy No.642901915) dated 28-3-1990, the other for Rs. 12,000/- vide policy No. 64219613 dated 27-2-1993. Both these policies were endowment policies with profits (accident benefit). The Petitioner widow was the nominee of both the policies. On 24/25-4-1993 Ganga Reddy was dragged out of his house by a group of naxalites at 1 a.m. He was beaten with butt-ends of the guns and also with sticks. He was ultimately taken to the Government Hospital, Kamareddy. On the advice of the Doctor there, Ganga Reddy was taken to Gandhi Hospital, Secunderabad where he was pronounced dead. Apparently, Ganga Reddy had died on his way to Gandhi Hospital.

The Complainant being the widow and nominee of the two policies of Ganga Reddy, submitted claims for payment under the aforesaid two policies to the Branch Manager and Divisional Manager of LIC of India. The Corporation paid a total sum of Rs. 1,53,749/- which was accepted by the widow under protest. On 23-6-1993 a letter addressed to the local Branch Manager of LIC stating that she was entitled to a further sum of Rs. 1,53,749/- under the two policies because the death had taken place by accident. The claim of the widow, however, was not entertained by the LIC. The widow has lodged a complaint before the District Forum which allowed the claim. The appeal against the order of the District Forum was also dismissed by the State Commission.

L.I.C. has now come up in revision before the National Commission. It has been contended on behalf of the LIC that whatever is payable under the policy has been paid to the widow on account of untimely death of M.Ganga Reddy. He has further contended that however unfortunate the circumstances of the case may be, the LIC is not under any legal obligation to pay any other amount than the sum of Rs. 1,53,749/- which has actually been paid to the widow. He does not deny that Ganga Reddy had paid a special premium to get double benefit in case of accidental death. But, according to him, the double benefit cannot be given in this case, as the death was not accidental. It was caused by Naxalites who came with a plan to attack Ganga Reddy. Ganga Reddy was apprehending an attack like this. That is why he had taken the double benefit policy.

We have no doubt, in our mind, that Ganga Reddy's death was accidental. What is accidental death and the circumstances in which the LIC was liable to pay double of the amount of the sum assured is contained in Clause 10 of the policy. It reads as under:

" Accident Benefit. If at any time when this policy is in force for the full Sum assured, the Life Assured, before the expiry of the period, for which the premium is payable or before the Policy anniversary on which the age nearer birthday of the Life Assured is 70 whichever is earlier is involved in an accident resulting in either permanent disability as, hereinafter defined or death and the same is proved to the satisfaction of the Corporation........."

"(b) Death of the Life Assured: To pay an additional sum equal to the Sum Assured under this Policy, if the Life Assured shall sustain any bodily injury resulting solely and directly from the accident caused by outward, violent and visible means and such injury shall within 120 days of the occurrence solely, directly and independently of all other causes resulted the death of the Life Assured. However, such additional sum payable in respect of this policy, together with any such additional sums payable under other Policies on the life of the Life assured shall not exceed Rs.5,00,000/-.

The Corporation shall not be liable to pay the additional sum referred in (a) or (b) above if the disability or the death of the Life Assured shall;

(i) be caused by intentional self injury, attempted suicide, insanity or immorality or whilst the Life Assured is under the influence of intoxicating liquor, drug or narcotic, or;

(ii) take place as result of accident while the Life Assured is engaged in aviation or aeronautics in any capacity other than that of a fare-paying, part-paying, or non-paying passenger in any aircraft which is authorised by the relevant regulations to carry such passengers and flying between established aerodromes, the Life Assured having all that time no duties on board the aircraft or requiring descent therefrom; or

(iii) be caused by injuries, resulting from riots, civil commotion, rebellion, war (whether war be declared or not), invasion, hunting, mountaineering, steeple chasing or racing of any kind; or

(iv) result from the Life Assured committing any breach of law; or

(v) arise from employment of the Life Assured in the armed forces or military service of any country at war (whether war be declared or not). 

The extra premium for this benefit will not be required to be paid after all premiums under this Policy have been paid or on and after the Policy anniversary on which the age nearer birthday of the Life Assured is 70 years, whichever is earlier."

There is no doubt in this case that Ganga Reddy did not die of natural causes. He was done to death in a violent manner. The premature termination of life of Ganga Reddy took place because of the injuries inflicted upon him by a group of persons. The scope and meaning of the word 'accident' used in a policy of insurance was examined in England as early as in 1893 in the case of Hamlyn Vs. Crown Accidental Insurance Co. Ltd. 1983 LR 751(C.A.). In that case the insurance company was to pay compensation to the assured for 'any bodily injury caused by violent, accidental, external and visible means'. In that case the Plaintiff was a tradesman. A customer came into the shop with a child. The child dropped a marble which the Plaintiff stopped forward to pick up. In doing so he wrenched his knee and could not get it straight again. He was disabled for nine weeks. The injury which he suffered was described as a dislocation of the internal cartilage of the knee-joint. The question before the Court of Appeal was whether this injury could be treated as accidental. Lord Esher, M.R. observed that in trying to pick up the marble, the Plaintiff wrenched his knee which did the mischief and the wrench was the cause of the injury. Lord Esher, M.R., observed;

"That that was accidental I cannot doubt. He did not mean to wrench his knee, and that would not be the ordinary result of such an action".

Lord Lopes, L.J., in his concurring judgment observed;

"The cause of the injury was accidental in the sense that the injury was a casualty and unforeseen and unexpected".

In this case it cannot be said that the death resulted from natural consequences of events in the life of the deceased. He was dragged out of the house and the injuries inflicted upon him lead to his death. Moreover, the dispute is put beyond doubt by the express provisions of sub-clause (b) of Clause 10 of the Insurance Policy which we have set out earlier in the Judgment. It says that the liability to pay an additional sum equal to the sum assured under the policy will arise if the assured shall sustain any bodily injury resulting solely and directly from "the accident caused by outward, violent and visible means". If the injury caused by such accident results in death within 120 days of its occurrence, the additional sum will be paid. There cannot be any doubt that the assured had sustained bodily injury which resulted in death within 24 hours. There cannot also be any dispute that the injury was caused by outward, violent and visible means. The assured was dragged out of his house, struck by butts of guns and injuries were inflicted upon him by the outward acts of a violent nature. In view of the language employed in sub-clause (b) of Clause 10, the LIC cannot say that the assured's death was not accidental nor can it be laid that the injuries of which he died were not caused by outward, violent and visible means.

The next argument on behalf of LIC is that even if the Complainant (Petitioner herein) succeeds in establishing a case of violent death, the case will fall within the exceptions contained in Clause 10 of the policy. According to Mr. Taneja, the death of Ganga Reddy took place because he had suffered injuries "resulting from riots". It was argued that ten persons with common intent had come and dragged Ganga Reddy of his house and thereafter inflicted injuries upon him out of which he died. The police case that was registered was under Sections 147, 148 and 302 of I.P.C. It is contended that the word "riot" has to be understood in the strict legal sense. About ten persons belonging to P.W.G. War Group were involved in the murder of Ganga Reddy and a Crime Case No.34/93 was registered at the local police station.

The case of the LIC is that the case clearly falls within one of the exceptions of Clause 10 and the Complainant is not entitled to get anything by way of double benefit.  We are unable to uphold the contention. We are of the view that the word "riot" has not been used strictly in the legal sense. The benefit of the double payment will be lost if death was caused, inter alia, by "injuries, resulting from riots, civil commotion, rebellion, war (whether war be declared or not), invasion, hunting, mountaineering, steeple-chasing or racing of any kind". Civil commotion, rebellion, invasion, hunting, mountaineering, steeple-chasing or racing are not technical or legal terms. In this context, it is not right to assume that "riots" have to be understood in any technical legal sense, and when ten persons forcibly dragged the deceased out of his house and inflicted bodily injuries upon him, a riot had taken place. According to the New Webster's Dictionary and Thesaurus of the English Language, 1992 Edition, (page 858) "Riot" means: "A public tumult, often in defiance of authority and the law and sometimes destructive of life or property." If death is caused by injuries suffered in civil commotion, rebellion, war, invasion etc. the double benefit will not be given by the LIC. It means that if any unusual disturbance was going on in any area and the deceased was caught in that disturbance and died, the LIC will not make the double payment. The word "riot" has to be understood in the context of the other words in that clause like civil commotion, rebellion, war, invasion. All these words denote some sort of public tumult which is also the dictionary meaning of riot. In this case there was no public disturbance. The assured was dragged out of his house by a group of persons and thereafter beaten to death. This was an isolated individual case. There was no general disturbance in this locality. This may constitute rioting by the guilty person under section 146 of the Indian Penal Code because five or more persons were involved in the incident. But it will not be so in common parlance. It is also important to note that the language used in the exception clause is "resulting from riots". "Riots" has been used in the plural unlike civil commotion, war or rebellion. This means that when riots were taking place in any particular area and the assured died as a result of injuries suffered in such riots, he will come within the exception clause. But one isolated case of rioting will not fall within the mischief of this clause. In the instant case, it cannot be said that the assured died of injuries "resulting from riots".

There is a further aspect of this case. The Indian Penal Code has defined 'unlawful assembly' as an assembly of five or more persons for certain unlawful purposes (section 141). If fire or violence is used by an unlawful assembly or any member thereof in prosecution of the common object of the assembly, every member of such assembly is guilty of rioting (section 146).

We are of the view that having regard to the wording of exception clause before us, the word "riots" has to be understood in the general sense and not in the sense in which it has been used in the Indian Penal Code. Otherwise, strange consequences will follow. If only four persons came and killed the assured the Insurance Company will be liable to make double payment. But, if five persons came and killed the assured the Insurance Company will not be so liable. This construction leads to absurdity and has to be avoided. We are of the view that in the facts of this case, in the absence of any public tumult, the death of the assured was not due to injuries "resulting from riots".

The State Commission has come to a correct decision in holding that the LIC is liable to pay a further sum of Rs. 1,53,749/- to the Complainant (Revision Petitioner herein). The Revision Petition is disposed of as above. There is no order as to costs.